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HIGH LIGHTS OF THE GERMAN -SOVIET WAR
By O. PRINCIPINI
The Genllo71·S0-vjct tUt'lr is being lough.t on Sitch It tre1tlendous seate
01 ?/len and miles that it will lor a wng time be impossible to obtain a.
clear lJieture of the actual course of events. Yet 80me general outlines
are discernible. It is al?'eady obvious that the battle between Germany
and the USSR differs from th~ previous campaigns of the prcsent war.
Here a'/'e the views of a competent obsertler on the Ii-rst twelve weeks 01
hostilitics.-K.M.
The Russo-German conflict, in the
"first twelve weeks of war, has had two
essential phases-the "battle of the
frontier" and the "battle of the Stalin
Line": battles of giants, the struggle
of colossa" armies, along frontiers and
in war-zones practically unlimited.
While it is still too early thoroughly
to examine the various phases of the
fighting, certain conclusions are already
clearly enough revealed. However, an
objective military or political observer,
before reaching definite conclusions,
must proceed cautiously. limiting him-
self to a rational examination of the
'first fundamental aspects of the tre-
mendous struggle and deducting from
them the basic elements for a logical
and well-based judgment.
Out of the fog of military secrecy the
first lights and shadows of the new
war have begun to appear.
Russia, upon entering this war, could
rely on two sources of strength: the
tremendous distances, and the huge
reserves of man-power and materials;
we shall later see how these have been
utilized by the Red High Command.
Initiative and surprise-two fun-
damental elements of success in war-
seem t.o have disappeared immediately,
and perhaps forever, from the hands
of the Red Headquarters. Three other
elements, however, seem still uncertain
to the distant observer: the moral
c!)hesion of the Red troops; the leader-
ship of the Red Command; and the
actual p;ovision of adequate, timely
and effiCIent material aid to the Soviet
Union by Britain and America.
NO BLITZKRIEG IN RUSSIA?
During the first week of the war
there was real fear in London and
Washington, perhaps more than in
Moscow, of seeing Russia "blitzed" in
a few weeks, as had been the case first
in Pola.nd. then France, and most re-
cently in Yugoslavia and Greece. And
as Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev are
today still in Russian hands, the Anglo-
American press speaks of a victorious
Russian resistance.
The truth may very soon turn out to
be quite different. It seems that in the
Russian campaign the German Com-
mand has again taken the enemy by
surprise, not only in the choice of time
but also in the choice of tactical
methods. It should be remembered
that the real military purpose of a war
is the defeat of the enemy forces, not
the occupation of enemy territories.
Victory is very often manifested, it is
true, by the occupation of enemy ter-
ritories, but not unless the occupation
of the strategic territorial objectives
presupposes the destruction of the de-
fending forces by depriving the enemy
of the very sources of his war-power
and by striking directly at the heart
and will of enemy resistance. All this
is only true if, after the objectives
have been reached, there are no more
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enemy forces left capable of annulling
the success already obtained.
From reports known to us up to now
-reports that are necessarily frag-
mentary and incomplete - we are
prompted to conclude that the German
Command is applying in Russia a new
tactical method which is perhaps most
appropriate to the particular situation
on the Russian front. There has been
no spectacular drive, none of those
audacious, impressive, arrow-like
thrusts, as that on Lemberg in 1939 to
cut any possible junction of Poland
with Rumania, or as in France in 1940
the thrust on Amiens, Abbeville, and
Dunkirk, or that on Athens through
Salonika and Larissa. In the Russian
campaign, the day-to-day situation of
the opposing fronts has on Borne days
shown wide and deep indentations to-
ward the east; but generally the fronts
have kept, and are continuing to keep,
an almost unbroken line.
Perhaps the German Command, tak-
ing into consideration the vastness of
the Red provinces and the great nume-
rical strength of the Soviet armies,
preferred to thrust directly into sepa·
rate enemy armies instead of at great
territorial objectives. In other words,
"blitzkrieg" localized against the de-
fending forces, as at Bialystok and
Minsk, at Vitebsk and Smolensk, as re-
cently between the lower Bug and lowt;r
Dniepr and as in many other locali-
ties all along the wide Russian front.
STALIN LOSES ADVANTAGE OF
SPACE
Another of the main conclusions it
has been possible to draw immediately
after the "battle of the frontier" is
that Stalin has been compelled to give
up his advantage of space. Enormous
Russian land and aerial forces have
been compelled to fight and have been
defeated, all along the frontier, since
the first day of the campaign without
being able to withdraw to the main
Russian defense line.
The "hattIe of the frontier" has fully
confirmed what the German High Com-
mand suspected, namely, that Russia
was for a long time secretly preparing
for war, massing her forces to strike
at Germany while the latter was en-
gaged on other fronts. The tenacious
resistance met by the German troops
since the first day of this campaign
has been possible only because there
were already Russian troops and mate-
rial at the Russo-German frontier prac-
tically ready to start the offensive
themselves.
Perha.ps history will later record
that it is just this which has been the
fatal self-condemnation of Soviet Rus-
~a. The timely move of the German
Army compelled the Soviet Command
to employ a great quantity of its forces
when the Red Army was not yet com-
pletely ready to fight. And moreover,
to fight not only at a time but also in
a territory and in a manner less favor-
able to the Soviet forces.
In a defensive struggle such as the
one now imposed on the Soviet forces,
the Russian High Command had prob-
ably intended to exploit to the maxi-
mum the vastness and depth of the
endless Soviet territory: in other words,
to give up space in order to gain time;
to gain time in order to prepare a fight
under the most favorable conditions,
namely, where, when, and in which-
ever way the grouping of her own
forces and the general situation
makes It advisable to fight, that
is, to maintain the bulk of her own
forces at a great distance from the
enemy with a view to keeping fully her
own freedom of action and of maneu-
ver; to withdraw as far as possible
from the starting-bases of the German
forces in order to compel the German
Command to lose time by searching for
the enemy, to build new advance-bases
for its land and air forces, and to re-
open long ways of communication or
to bring into use new ones.
We all know today that exactly the
opposite happened. The Red High
Command had deployed towards the
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west all the bulk, and perhaps the best
part. of its mammoth war-machine: its
headquarters, its mechanized units, its
imposing land troops, its airfields, its
deposits of supplies. These Russian
forces, arrayed for an attack, were now
suddenly forced to fight a defensive
battle in a mo t critical situation. Since
it was impo..sible to take up in time
positions further back-as would have
been advisable in a defensive battle--
the Russian Command had to accept
open battle from the first day of the
war, under conditions of great dis-
advantage to its own forces. Indeed
the German Army was able, from the
beginning of the campaign, to develop
to the full its unfa.iling ability for the
offensive, operating at short distances
from its own starting-bases.
For the Russian High Command the
surprise was complete. Not until after
the first week of war was it reorganiz-
ed and the front divided into the
three known sectors: northern, central,
and southern (Voroshilov, Timoshenko,
Budenny).
THE STALIN LINE
The Stalin Line has already given
its name to the second phas'e of the
war. The fate of the great fortified
lines in this war has been unfortunate.
Mannerheim, Maginot, and Metaxas
were really ill-advised to give their
names to the principal defensive or-
ganizations of Finland, France, and
Greece. Will the name of Stalin be
any more fortunate? The results so
far achieved by the Germans justify
us in seriously doubting this.
We do not as yet precisely know
either the actual course or the con-
structive details of the "Stalin Line."
It would seem likely that such a line
has for its main object the defense of
Moscow, Leningrad, and Kharkov; for
it more immediate object the defense
of the line of great advance centres:
Reval-Smolensk-Kiev-Odessa. A sum-
mary glance at the map of Russia is
sufficient to mnke clear that this line
is undoubtedly powerful, due perhaps
more to its natural advantages than its
defensive preparations. Of great value
are the supporting wings at the two
opposite ends of the line, facing re-
spectively the Baltic and the Black
Seas.
In the north, the system seems to
have consisted of an advanced line of
defense along the lower river Dvina, a
line which is completed in the rear by
an excellent defense in depth, linked up
with the Lake Peipus region and sup-
ported at a convenient distance by the
naval base of Kronstadt and the great
sUpply base of Leningrad.
In the south. on the Black Sea front,
there was another multiple system of
defense lines. First, an advanced line of
fortifications along the lower Dniestr,
well supported by the central supply
base of Odessa and by the naval base of
Niko}ayev. The main defense line was
perhaps constructed along the lower
river Bug. Still further to the east is
a defense line curving back onto the
lower Dniepr, whose course at this
point turns in again towards the east,
which is not very favorable for the
economical defense of that territory.
In the centre, the Stalin Line was
probably based on the rivers Dvina and
Dniepr. Toward its centre the courses
of these two rivers (flowing in opposite
directions) do not meet but turn off at
an abrupt right.angle to the east,
forming in that sector a wide corridor,
long known as the "CQrridor of Smo-
lensk." The cities of Vitebsk and
Smolensk are both within this corridor.
This is precisely the most dangerous
point of the whole front, for through
here passes the shortest route to Mos-
cow, that is to the heart of the whole
Russian defense system. SmCllensk
really deserves the name of the Western
Gate of Moscow. Napoleon used this
route for his advance on Moscow. In
this ~ar. Smolensk has already given
its name to what is perhaps so far
the bloodiest battle of the war. Both
Vitebsk and Smolensk are entirely in
the hands of German troops.
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THE BATTLE OF THE STALIN
LINE
This battle appears so far to be the
decisive battle of the whole Russian
campaign. War communiques confirm
with daily increasing clarity that the
Russian High Command has decided to
throw into the Stalin Line the greater
part of its fighting forces. The battle
is still in full swing, but the outlines
~re visible.
For many weeks the German High
Command has been hammering at the
Stalin Line at various points, alternat-
ing its blows between the centre and
the north and the centre and the
south; with feints to the right and real
blows to the left; with feints towards
the Baltic and a terrific blow towards
the Black Sea. The Soviet Command
has tried to parry these blows as best
it could, and to stop up with all pos-
sible haste the most threatening gaps
in the system, thereby undoubtedly
using up tremendous quantities of its
land and air forces.
In the south, large Axis forces have
got around the Dniestr and Bug from
above, so 'that these two rivers have
quickly lost all defensive value. The
conquest of Nikolayev has effectively
-sealed the fate of Odessa, if not the
potential fate of the whole rich coastal
region facing the Black Sea. In the
centre, large German forces have cross-
ed the Dniepr, and turning to the
south. already menace the rear of the
whole defense system hinging on the
great population centre of Kiev. In
the northern sector, Leningrad is
gripped in a vice, from the south and
from the north. The fall of Leningrad
would entail that of Kronstadt, where-
by the Soviet forces lose their last
remaining communications with the
Baltic.
THE SOVIET UNION NEEDS MORE
ARMS
At the beginnin~of the war the world
was stunned by information published
,about the Soviet Army: officers, air-
planes, tanks, in tens upon tens of
thousands, soldiers in tens of millions;
and other practically inexhaustible war
resources in general. Truly impressive
figures, even in comparison with the
colossal war machines of the most mo-
dern and most powerful countries in
the world.
Today, after over two months of war,
Stalin has apparently sent out desper-
ate S.O.S. messages to his friends in
London and Washington. We do not
know yet whether he has asked for aid
in the form of man-power; but he has
certainly made urgent requests for help
in the form of war machinery and
munitions, and perhaps of fo?d; and
it seems he even needs gasolme and
other fuels and lubricants.
Supposing that all these things were
available. how are they going to reach
Russia? There is the painful ques-
tion of ships already sunk in huge
numbers on all the Seven Seas. This
problem of transport was of most
pressing urgency even before the Ger-
man-Soviet war created new demands.
THE SOVIET COMMAND AND THE
RUSSIAN SOLDIER
The capacity for leadership of the
Russian High Command cannot yet be
definitely judged, but it can already be
subjected to severe criticism. The Red
Army has long been called a "giant
with a head of clay:' Years of "Red
purges" have wrought havoc in the
Army, particularly in the upper com-
mand, causing a grave crisis in quantity
and quality, which has most certainly
had an unfavorable influence on the
conduct of the war. Up till now the
Russian High Command has had to
submit almost entirely to the initiative
of the enemy.
Commanders and general staffs are
not to be found in a hurry. To prepare
good military leaders, just as to pre-
pare good scientists, years of intensive,
patient, and conscientious work are
necessary; above all today, when tech-
nical science pervades and often pre-
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dominates in nearly all fields of war
activity. The use of large modern
armies, provided with complex and de-
licate instruments of war, requires in
the commanders a capacity for organi-
zation which can only be acquired after
long and assiduous experience of com-
mand.
Anti-Soviet propaganda, especially
that of England and America, has
always represented Russia as a herd
of cattle, held together by the whip
of the herdsman Stalin with the aid of
his faithful horde of vicious watchdogs,
the OGPU. With or without a whip,
the fact remains that the Red soldiers
have certainly put up a good fight these
first two months of war. The German
Command has not failed to point this
out. The younger generation in Rus-
sia, having grown up in the atmo-
sphere of the Soviet regime, has learned
to obey, to march and to die.
THE RED ARMY AND THE LES-
SONS OF PREVIOUS CAMPAIGNS
Russia entered the war nearly two
years after the outbreak of the present
European war. By now the Red Army
has had the benefit of utilizing to its
own advantage the lessons learned by
others through experience. In this
war, absolute supremacy in land war-
fare has until now been held con-
tinuously by the airplane and the tank.
The binomial term of attack, "planes
and tanks," has suddenly altogether
ousted the old binomial term of defense,
"trenches and machine-guns," which
largely predominated in aU sectors of
the last World War.
Up till the beginning of the present
war, the Red Army seemed to be
among the best equipped in the world,
especially in the fields of aviation and
mechanized forces; at least in quantity
if not in quality. It was therefore in
a position to carry out a rapid adapta-
tion to new methods of land warfare,
based precisely on the intelligent use of
airplanes and tanks.
In conBidering the Soviet perfor-
mances so far one must recognize that
"planes and tanks" are primarily used
for offensive and counter-offensive.
Russia, forced suddenly to fight on the
defensive, has not been able to make
much use of her gIl'eat numeric'a!
strength in airplanes and tanks; more-
over many were quickly destroyed by
the German forces. . The overrated
Soviet parachute troops never put in
a serious appearance.
The Red Army does not seem to
have succeeded in contriving an "armor
of defense" capable of halting effective-
ly the attacking might of modern
technical and aerial forces. But it has
learned from the French defeat to fight
in a very deep front and always to
keep sufficient reserves to deal with
enemy forces that have succeeded in
breaking through.
REPERCUSSIONS
In the general fielg of the European
conflict, the beginning of the Russo-
German campaign had tremendous re-
percussions; it was immediately hailed
by the Anglo-American press. London
heaved a sigh of relief. The specter
of a German invasion vanished once
again. At Suez and at Gibraltar
anxiety diminished. Traditional British
policy could really boast of a genuine
success. At last a new ally had joined
the British Forces. Stalin was prepar-
ing to fight to the last RusBian. In
the heart of every EnglishQlan was
kindled the hope of seeing Germany
hopelessly bogged in the Pripet
marshes, crushed in the embrace of the
Russian giant.
But apparently Stalin was more
realistic, directly attacking the vital
part of the problem: the active and
effective co-operation of England and
America. He would not be satisfied
with empty guarantees like those given
to Poland and others. He wanted not
fine words but deeds: airplanes, can-
nons, munitions; not bombardments by
Reuter but genuine and effective-
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•
bombardments against the common
enemy; fewer hymns of praise in honor
of the Soviet soldiers but effective co-
operation of British soldiers.
This new problem soon became a
major anxiety for London as well as
Washington. Were they to make
British troops march on the heels of
the Axis? This was without doubt the
most propitious moment to date, with
the greater part of the Axis troops
engaged on the eastern front.
But where were they to march
British troops to? The European con-
tinent? The High Command in London
is still nursing the wounds received by
British forces in Norway, at D~nkirk,
and in the Balkans. Moreover, to dis-
embark on the Continent would mean
ships, thousands of ships.
Perhaps the possibility could be
examined of another enterprise where
the going was easy, such as the offen-
sive in Cyrenaica against Italian troops
who were without mechanized equip-
ment; or the offensive in East Africa
against Italian forces who had been
isolated from their own country for a
year; or the most recent campaigns
against Iraq and the French in Syria?
We know now that the answer was
Iran. This occupation of a neutral
country brings British soldiers to the
Persian oilfields and to the gates of
those of Baku. How much the Russians
will benefit by it, remains to be seen.
